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Abstract
In order to avoid the paradoxes of standard deontic logic, we have to give up the semantic construc-
tion that identifies obligatory status with presence in all elements of a subset of the set of possible
worlds. It is proposed that deontic logic should instead be based on a preference relation, according
to the principle that whatever is better than something permitted is itself permitted. Close connec-
tions hold between the logical properties of a preference relation and those of the deontic logics that
are derived from it in this way. The paradoxes of SDL can be avoided with this construction, but it is
still an open question what type of preference relation is best suited to be used as a basis for deontic
logic.
 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Modern deontic logic began with a seminal paper by Georg Henrik von Wright in 1951.1
With a minor modification,2 his list of postulates has turned out to be characterizable by
a simple semantical construction that has since then dominated the subject: It is assumed
that there is a subset of the set of possible worlds (the “ideal worlds”) such that for any
sentence p,Op (meaning that p is obligatory) holds if and only if p holds in all of these
worlds. This is standard deontic logic (SDL); its basic principle is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The term “possible world” is ambiguous. In a logical sense, a possible world is a max-
imal consistent subset of the sentences of a given language. In a metaphysical sense, a
possible world is a complete description of how the world could be. The holistic alter-
natives used in the SDL semantics have to be possible worlds in a logical sense, but not
E-mail address: soh@infra.kth.se (S.O. Hansson).
1 [13]. On the origins of deontic logic, see Føllesdal and Hilpinen [2] and von Wright [14].
2 Acceptance of the postulate O(p ∨ ¬p).
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necessarily in a metaphysical sense. They can, for instance, represent the combinations of
actions that are open to an individual (rather than the worlds that she might inhabit). In
order to avoid confusion with metaphysical possible worlds, I will use the terms “holistic
alternative” and “alternative” instead of “possible world”.
The valid sentences of SDL coincide with the theorems derivable from the following
three axioms:
Op → ¬O¬p,
Op & Oq ↔ O(p&q), and
O(p ∨ ¬p).3
It is common to assume that the selection of alternatives shown in Fig. 1 is based on an
ordering of the alternatives, as in Fig. 2. The ideal alternatives are then identified with the
maximal (best) alternatives according to that ordering. This construction makes it possible
to extend SDL to conditional norms. In order to determine what obligations hold if s is
true, we just restrict our attention to alternatives in which s is true, and identify the ideal
alternatives with the alternatives that are best (maximal) in this restricted set (Fig. 3).
SDL semantics is admirably simple and elegant. Unfortunately, it forces us to rather
implausible conclusions. If we identify obligatory status with presence in all elements of a
certain subset of the alternative set, then the following property will invariably hold:
If  p → q, then  Op → Oq.
3 [2, p. 13].
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Fig. 3. Standard deontic logic, modified to account for conditional obligations.
This property has many names. I prefer to call it necessitation since it says that whatever is
necessitated by a moral requirement is itself a moral requirement. As an example, suppose
that I am morally required to take a boat without the consent of its owner and use it to rescue
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a drowning person. Let p denote this composite action that I am required to perform, and
let q denote the part of it that consists in taking the boat without leave. Since q follows
logically from p, I am logically necessitated to perform q in order to perform p. According
to the postulate of necessitation, I then have an obligation to q . This is contestable, since I
have no obligation to q in isolation.
Necessitation gives rise to most of the major deontic paradoxes. We may call these
the necessitation paradoxes. Four of the most prominent are Ross’s paradox, the paradox
of commitment, the Good Samaritan, and the Knower. Ross’s paradox is based on the
instance Op → O(p ∨ q) of necessitation. (“If you ought to mail the letter, then you ought
to either mail or burn it.” [12, p. 62]) The paradox of commitment is based on the instance
O¬p → O(p → q), which is interpreted as saying that if you do what is forbidden, then
you are required to do anything whatsoever. (“If it is forbidden for you to steal this car,
then if you steal it you ought to run over a pedestrian.” [10]) The Good Samaritan operates
on two sentences p and q , such that q denotes some atrocity and p some good act that can
only take place if q takes place. We then have  p → q , and it follows by necessitation
that if Op then Oq. (“You ought to help the assaulted person. Therefore, there ought to be
an assaulted person.” [11, p. 144]) Åqvist’s Knower paradox makes use of the epistemic
principle that only that which is true can be known. Here, q denotes some wrongful action,
and p denotes that q is known by someone who is required to know it. Again, we have
 p → q and Op, and it follows by necessitation that Oq. (“If the police officer ought to
know that Smith robbed Jones, then Smith ought to rob Jones.” [1])
It is the purpose of the present presentation to show how we can save deontic logic
from the necessitation paradoxes. In order to achieve this we will have to give up the basic
semantic idea of SDL, and hopefully find some other, more plausible semantic principle
for deontic logic.
The subject-matter of deontic logic is quite complex. It includes defeasible norms, coun-
terfactual norms, normative rules, multiagent norms, etc. For the purposes of the present
presentation I will leave as much as possible of this complexity aside, and focus on situ-
ationist deontic logic, i.e., the deontic logic of that fraction of normative discourse which
refers only to one moral appraisal of one situation. No changes in the situation or shifts
in the perspective are allowed (which excludes deontic counterfactuals), and no general
deontic statements (such as rules) will be represented [5, Chapter 9]. Furthermore, I will
assume that obligations refer to actions (or omissions), so that p in Op is a sentence that
represents an action. (For simple reference I will use “action” and as a short term for
“action-representing sentence”.)
2. Basing deontic logic more directly on preferences
I propose that we base deontic logic on preferences, but not in the indirect way shown
in Figs. 2 and 3. Instead of using a preference relation on (holistic) alternatives, we can
apply a preference relation directly to the actions that are the actual objects of obligations
and permissions, as in Fig. 4. Clearly, preferences over actions can in their turn be based
on preferences over holistic alternatives. To begin with, however, I will make no such
assumption but take the preference relation over actions to be primitive. (In Sections 4, 5
S.O. Hansson / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 3–18 7Fig. 4. Deontic logic based directly on a preference relation over actions.
I will return to the derivation of preference relations over single actions from preference
relations over alternatives.)
Can we insert normative predicates into a preference structure in the same way that
we can insert a monadic predicate such as “best” or “bad”? To pursue this possibility,
consider the following two classes of value predicates that can be inserted into a preference
structure:
A monadic predicate H is -positive if and only if for all p and q :
Hp & q  p → Hq.
It is -negative if and only if for all p and q :
Hp & p  q → Hq.
Among the positive predicates we find such value predicates as “good”, “best”, “not worst”,
“very good”, “excellent”, “not very bad”, “acceptable”, etc. If one of these predicates holds
for p, then it also holds for everything that is better than p or equal in value to p. Among
the negative predicates we find “bad”, “very bad”, “worst”, and “not best”. If one of these
predicates holds for p, then it also holds for everything that is worse than p or equal in
value to p.
An obvious option for a semantics of “ought” is to construct it as a positive predicate:
The positivity thesis. Prescriptive predicates satisfy positivity.
One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to insert several prescriptive predi-
cates of different strengths. This is useful since both our prescriptions and our prescriptive
8 S.O. Hansson / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 3–18
expressions differ in strength; “must” is more stringent than “ought”, and “ought” is more
stringent than “should”.
Unfortunately, however, this simple construction is not at all plausible. There are at least
two classes of counterexamples that can be used against it.
The first class of counterexamples follows the recipe: Let p represent something morally
required, and q a supererogatory variant of p. Concretely, let p denote that you return a
borrowed motorcar in time to its owner and q that you return it in time to its owner after
first having washed it and filled the petrol tank. It is quite plausible to value q higher than
p but nevertheless maintain that p but not q is morally required.
In the other class of counterexamples, the recipe is as follows: Let p represent some-
thing morally required, and q a variant of p that is specified in some morally irrelevant
way. Concretely, let p denote that I visit my sick aunt, and q that I do this, entering her
flat with my left foot first. Then p and q have equal value, but nevertheless p but not q has
obligatory status, contrary to the positivity thesis.
Fortunately, there is an alternative to the positivity thesis. To introduce it we need the
following definition:
Definition. A (monadic) predicate H is -contranegative if and only if for all p and q :
Hp & (¬p) (¬q) → Hq.
My proposal is to base the semantics of deontic logic on the semantic principle that
prescriptive predicates are contranegative. Hence, if you ought to work hard, and it is worse
to be drunk than not to work hard, then you ought not to be drunk:
The contranegativity thesis [4]. Prescriptive predicates satisfy contranegativity.
This principle shares with the positivity thesis the advantage of allowing for several pre-
scriptive predicates with different strengths. Neither of the two types of counterexamples
that were so easily constructed for the positivity thesis can be transferred to contraneg-
ative predicates. Furthermore, the contranegativity thesis yields plausible results for the
corresponding permissive and prohibitive predicates, defined in the standard way:
Observation 1. Let O,P , and F be predicates with a common domain that is closed under
negation, and such that for all p,Op if and only if ¬P¬p, and Op if and only if F¬p. Let
 be a relation over this domain. Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
(1) O satisfies -contranegativity,
(2) P satisfies -positivity, and
(3) F satisfies -negativity.
Proof. Left to the reader. 
Hence, the contranegativity thesis supports the idea that what is better than something
permitted is itself permitted, and that what is worse than something forbidden is itself
S.O. Hansson / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 3–18 9
forbidden. The contranegativity thesis cannot be proved, but it can be corroborated by ex-
amples and by the lack of counterexamples. I propose that we accept it on a preliminary
basis, or at least as a hypothesis to be tested. The ultimate criterion for its acceptability
should of course be whether or not a plausible deontic logic can be based on it. In par-
ticular, can the well-known counter-intuitive results in SDL be avoided in a deontic logic
that satisfies contranegativity? In order to answer this question, we need to investigate the
logical properties of contranegative predicates.
3. General results for contranegative predicates
It turns out that important properties of contranegative predicates correspond closely
to properties of the preference relation on which they are based. The following theorem
summarizes some major results.
Theorem 1. A transitive and complete relation  satisfies:
(a) (p  (p ∨ q))∨ (q  (p ∨ q));
(b) ((p ∨ q) p) ∨ ((p ∨ q) q);
(c) (p  (p&q))∨ (p  (p&¬q));
(d) if  q → p, then p  q ;
(e) (p  (p&q))∨ (q  (p&q));
(f) (p  q)∨ ((¬p&q) q);
(g) p  (p&¬p);
if and only if every -contranegative predicate O satisfies:
(a) Op & Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration);
(b) O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq (disjunctive division);
(c) P(p&q) & P(p&¬q) → Pp (permissive cancellation);4
(d) if  p → q , then Op → Oq (necessitation);
(e) Op & Oq → O(p ∨ q) (disjunctive closure);
(f) Op & O(p → q) → Oq (deontic detachment);
(g) Op → O(p ∨ ¬p).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The deontic properties listed in (a), (b), and (c) are more plausible than most other
deontic postulates, and they are also closely related. To see their relatedness, first note that
permissive cancellation follows from disjunctive division.5
4 Obviously, for the corresponding permissive predicate P .
5 It is also worth noting that if  satisfies (p ∨ q  p) ∨ (p ∨ q  q), then it satisfies (p  (p&q)) ∨ (p 
(p&¬q)). This can be shown by substituting p&q for p and p&¬q for q.
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Observation 2. If a prescriptive predicate O satisfies disjunctive division, (O(p&q) →
Op∨Oq), then the corresponding permissive predicate P satisfies permissive cancellation
(P (p&q)&P(p&¬q) → Pp).
Proof. Substitute ¬(p&q) for p and ¬(p&¬q) for q :
O
(¬(p & q) & ¬(p & ¬q))→ O¬(p & q)∨ O¬(p & ¬q),
¬O¬(p & q) & ¬O¬(p & ¬q) → ¬O(¬(p & q) & ¬(p & ¬q)),
P (p & q) & P(p & ¬q) → P ((p & q)∨ (p & ¬q)),
P (p & q) & P(p & ¬q) → Pp.
The following property of a preference relation:
p  q → p  (p ∨ q) & (p ∨ q) q (disjunctive interpolation)
is quite plausible. It says that p∨q is intermediate in value between p and q . The following
observation provides us with two alternative formulations of this property:
Observation 3. Let  be a transitive and complete relation. Then it satisfies disjunctive
interpolation:
(1) iff it satisfies (p  (p ∨ q) q) ∨ (q  (p ∨ q) p), and
(2) iff it satisfies both (p  (p ∨ q)) ∨ (q  (p ∨ q)) and ((p ∨ q) p) ∨ ((p ∨ q) q).
Proof. Left to the reader. 
The two properties of  referred to in part (2) of Observation 3 coincide with the two
properties used in parts (a) and (b) of Theorem 1. We therefore obtain the following corol-
lary:
Corollary to Theorem 1(a), (b). A transitive and complete relation  satisfies
(h) p  q → p  (p ∨ q) & (p ∨ q) q (disjunctive interpolation)
if and only if every -contranegative predicate O satisfies
(h) both Op & Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration) and O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq (disjunctive
division).
Proof. From Theorem 1 and Observation 3. 
I have already argued that necessitation, the deontic postulate referred to in part (d)
of Theorem 1, is an implausible property. Disjunctive closure, the property referred to in
part (e), is also quite implausible. To see this, let p denote that I give the oldest of my
two children enough to eat, and q that I give my youngest child enough to eat. Then I am
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subject to the obligations representable as Op and Oq, but it would be strange to claim that
O(p ∨ q) represents one of the obligations that I have. (Since p ∨ q has to be satisfied
in order for my obligations to have been fulfilled, it has the same status as the disjunctive
statement in Ross’s paradox.)
Counterexamples are also available against deontic detachment, the property referred to
in part (e) [3,9]. Consider the following equivalent formulation of deontic detachment:
O(p ∨ q) & O¬p → Oq.
Suppose that you are for some reason morally required to come to a conference. You are
also required not to come unannounced. Let p denote that you stay away from the confer-
ence and q that you give notice that you will come. Then O(p ∨ q) and O¬p both hold,
but since you should not notify unless you come, Oq does not hold.
The property Op → O(p ∨ ¬p), that is referred to in part (g) of Theorem 1, is a weak-
ened form of one of the postulates of SDL, namely O(p ∨ ¬p). The weakened form is
used here for technical reasons.6 The postulate is implausible both in its original form and
in this weakened form. In particular, consider the equivalent version Oq → O(p ∨ ¬p) of
the weakened form, and counterexamples such as “If you are morally required to pay your
debts then you are morally required to either commit or not commit mass murder”.7
The consistency axiom of SDL, Op → ¬O¬p, is not suitable for being treated in the
same way as the deontic postulates listed in Theorem 1. The reason for this is that there
is no plausible way to construct a preference relation  such that all -contranegative
predicates satisfy the consistency postulate. This is shown in the following observation:
Observation 4. Let  be a complete and transitive relation, and let there be an element p
of its domain such that either p  (¬p) or (¬p) p. Then there is some-contranegative
predicate O that does not satisfy the consistency postulate (Op → ¬O¬p).
Proof. If p ¬p, then let O be such that for all q,Oq if and only if p ¬q . If (¬p) p,
then let O be such that for all q,Oq if and only if ¬p ¬q . 
4. Reintroducing holistic semantics
In order to obtain a more credible semantic basis for our deontic logic, it will be use-
ful to try to reintroduce holistic alternatives, and use a preference relation (denoted )
on them to derive the preference relation on actions that we use as the direct base of the
deontic logic. See Fig. 5, and note that no intermediate selection among the holistic al-
ternatives (as in Figs. 2, 3) is used. The idea behind this construction is of course that the
normative appraisal of actions should cohere with some reasonable appraisal of the holistic
alternatives in which these actions may appear.
6 There is no non-trivial preference relation  such that O(p∨¬p) holds for all -contranegative predicates.
The reason for this is that the empty predicate H , such that ¬Hr holds for all arguments r in its domain, vacuously
satisfies contranegativity with respect to any preference relation with an appropriate domain.
7 Cf. [7, p. 191] and [8, p. 31].
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I will focus on extremal preference relations. In the present context, this means that
the value of an action is completely determined by the values of the best and the worst
holistic alternatives that include this action. More precisely, for each action p, let max(p)
be the -best alternative in which p is included (or one of them, if there are several of
them). Similarly, let min(p) be the -worst alternative in which p is included. We can
then define the following extremal preferences:
– Maximin preferences:
p i q iff min(p) min(q).
– Maximax preferences:
p x q iff max(p) max(q).
– Interval maximin preferences:
p ix q iff either min(p)>min(q) or both min(p)≡min(q) and
max(p) max(q).
– Interval maximax preferences:
p xi q iff either max(p)>max(q) or both max(p)≡max(q) and
min(p) min(q).
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– Doubly maximizing preferences:
p ‡ q iff max(p) max(q) and min(p) min(q).
Two of these preference relations, namely maximin and maximax preferences, are well-
known. They can be said to represent extremely cautious respectively extremely risk-taking
decision-making. It has not always been appreciated how extreme the maximin rule is. It
requires, for instance, that one be indifferent between owning a valueless piece of paper and
owning a ticket in a two-ticket lottery in which the winner will receive€1 000 000 and the
loser will receive nothing. The interval maximin rule is a modification of the maximin rule
that avoids such extreme results. This rule maximizes both worst and best alternatives, but
gives maximization of the former absolute priority over maximization of the latter. Sim-
ilarly, interval maximax preference relations maximize both worst and best alternatives,
but give maximization of the latter absolute priority over maximization of the former. The
doubly maximizing preference relation requires maximization of both maximum and min-
imum, at the price of not being a complete relation.
Although the interval maximin and interval maximax preference relations mitigate the
rather strict principles of maximin and maximax preference relations, respectively, they
do so only to a limited degree. It is therefore also of interest to study a wider category of
extremal preferences that allows for all assignments of relative priorities to maximization
of the best and of the worst alternatives. This can be done as follows:
(1) v is a function that assigns a real number to each (holistic) alternative.
(2) vMAX(p) is the highest value of any alternative that includes p, and vMIN(p) the lowest
value of any alternative that includes p.
(3) δ is a number such that 0 < δ < 1. For all p:
vδ(p) = δ · vMAX(p) + (1 − δ) · vMIN(p).
(4) For all p,q :
p E q iff vδ(p) vδ(q) (max-min weighted preferences).
5. Representation theorems
Elsewhere I have reported a series of representation theorems for contranegative deontic
logics that are based on the types of preference relations introduced in the previous section
[5, pp. 161–164]. These theorems make use of a series of background assumptions, primar-
ily that the action-representing sentences can be divided into a finite number of equivalence
classes with respect to logical equivalence, and also some conditions relating to the lim-
iting cases of tautologous and contradictory action-representing sentences. Leaving aside
these details, the representation theorems are as follows:
(1) Maximin preferences:
O is i-contranegative iff it satisfies:
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(i) O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(ii) If Oq and  p → q , then Op (reverse necessitation); and
(iii) O⊥.
(2) Maximax preferences:
O is x-contranegative iff it satisfies:
(i) Op & Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration);
(ii) If Op and  p → q , then Oq (necessitation);
(iii) ¬O⊥ (consistency);
(iv) There is some p such that Op (non-emptiness).
(3) Interval maximin preferences:
O is ix-contranegative iff it satisfies:
(i) Op &Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration);
(ii) O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(iii) If  r → s,  s → p, and  p → q , and ¬Or, Os and ¬Op, then ¬Oq;
(iv) O⊥.
(4) Interval maximax preferences:
O is xi-contranegative iff it satisfies:
(i) Op & Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration);
(ii) O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(iii) If  r → s,  s → p, and  p → q , and Or, ¬Os and Op, then Oq;
(iv) ¬O⊥ (consistency);
(v) There is some p such that Op (non-emptiness).
(5) Doubly maximizing preferences:
O is ‡-contranegative iff it satisfies:
(i) Op & Oq → O(p&q);
(ii) If O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(iii) If  p → q ,  q → r , Op and Or, then Oq;
(iv) ¬O⊥;
(v) There is some p such that Op.
(6) Max-min weighted preferences:
O is E-contranegative (with 0 < δ < 1) iff it satisfies:
(i) Op & Oq → O(p&q) (agglomeration);
(ii) O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(iii) If F+p, F+q , F(p ∨ r), ¬F(p ∨ s), and ¬F(q ∨ r), then ¬F(q ∨ s);
(iv) If P+p, P+q , P(p ∨ r), ¬P(p ∨ s), and ¬P(q ∨ r), then ¬P(q ∨ s);
where
F+p iff F(p&t) for all t such that p&t is consistent,
P+p iff P(p&t) for all t such that p&t is consistent.
The proofs can be found in [5] except the proof of part (5), that is given in Appendix B.
The x-, i-, and ix-based operators all satisfy clearly implausible postulates (neces-
sitation, reverse necessitation, and O⊥). The other three types of deontic operators come
out better, but unfortunately each of these characterizations makes use of postulates that are
unsatisfactorily complex and difficult to grasp. Therefore, although some progress has been
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made in the construction of a plausible semantics for a deontic logic based on contraneg-
ativity, it still remains to develop a plausible semantic structure that has the simplicity of
SDL but not its implausible consequences.8
Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. Part a, from LHS to RHS: Let Op & Oq. We can apply the
substitution-instance ((¬p)  (¬p ∨ ¬q)) ∨ ((¬q)  ¬p ∨ ¬q) of LHS. If ((¬p) 
(¬p ∨ ¬q)), then due to contranegativity Op yields O¬(¬p ∨ ¬q), or equivalently
O(p&q). If ((¬q) (¬p ∨ ¬q)), then we can use Oq to obtain the same result.
Part a, from RHS to LHS: Let LHS be violated. We have to show that RHS does not
hold either. Since LHS is violated there are p and q such that p ∨ q > p and p ∨ q > q .
Since is complete, either p  q or q  p. Without loss of generality we may assume that
p  q . Let O be the predicate such that for all r,Or holds if and only if p  ¬r . Clearly,
O is contranegative. We have p  p,p  q , and p ∨ q > p. Hence, O(¬p),O(¬q) and
¬O(¬p&¬q), so that RHS does not hold.
Part b, from LHS to RHS: Let O(p&q), i.e., O¬(¬p ∨ ¬q). According to LHS, either
¬p ∨¬q ¬p or ¬p ∨¬q ¬q . In the first case, Op follows from contranegativity, and
in the second case Oq follows in the same way.
Part b, from RHS to LHS: Let LHS be violated. Then there are p and q such that p >
(p ∨ q) and q > (p ∨ q). Let O be such that for all r,Or holds if and only if p ∨ q ¬r .
Then O is contranegative, and O(¬p&¬q), ¬O¬p, and ¬O¬q .
Part c, from LHS to RHS: If p  (p&q), then we can use P(p&q) and the positivity
of P to obtain Pp. If p  (p&¬q), then we can use P(p&¬q) and the positivity of P to
obtain Pp.
Part c, from RHS to LHS: Let LHS be violated. Then there are p and q such that p&q >
p and p&¬q > p. Due to completeness, either (p&q) (p&¬q) or (p&¬q) (p&q). If
(p&q) (p&¬q), let P be such that for all r,P r iff r  (p&¬q). Then P is -positive,
and it follows directly that P(p&q) and P(p&¬q). It follows from p&¬q > p that ¬Pp.
The case when (p&¬q) (p&q) is treated analogously.
Part d, from LHS to RHS: Let LHS hold. Let  p → q and Op. Then, equivalently:
 ¬q → ¬p. It follows from LHS that ¬p  ¬q and from the contranegativity of O that
Oq.
Part d, from RHS to LHS: Let LHS be violated. Then there are there are p and q such
that  q → p and q > p.
Let O be the predicate such that for all r,Or holds if and only if p  ¬r . Then O
is -contranegative. It follows from p  p and q > p that O(¬p) and ¬O(¬q). Since
 ¬p → ¬q , RHS is violated.
Part e, from LHS to RHS: Let Op & Oq. From LHS we obtain ¬p  ¬p&¬q or
¬q  ¬p&¬q , equivalently: ¬p  ¬(p ∨ q) or ¬q  ¬(p ∨ q). The rest follows by
-contranegativity.
8 See [6] for some further formal results relating to this problem.
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Part e, from RHS to LHS: Let LHS be violated. Then there are p and q such that p&q >
p and p&q > q . Due to completeness, either p  q or q  p. If p  q , let O be the
predicate such that for all r,Or if and only if p  ¬r . Then O is contranegative, and
O¬p, O¬q , and ¬O¬(p&q), contrary to RHS. The other case is proved analogously.
Part f, from LHS to RHS: Let Op & O(p → q). It follows from LHS that ((¬p) 
(¬q))∨ ((p&¬q) (¬q)). If ((¬p) (¬q)), then Oq follows from Op due to contraneg-
ativity. If ((p&¬q)  (¬q)) or equivalently, ¬(p → q)  (¬q), then Oq follows in the
same way from O(p → q).
Part f, from RHS to LHS: We are going to assume that LHS does not hold, and prove
that then neither does RHS. Since LHS does not hold, there are p and q such that q > p
and q > (¬p&q). Due to completeness, either p  (¬p&q) or (¬p&q) p.
Case 1, p  (¬p&q): Let O be the such that for all r,Or holds if and only if p  ¬r .
Then O is-contranegative. It therefore follows from p  p that O¬p, from p  (¬p&q)
that O(q → p), and from q > p that ¬O¬q .
Case 2, (¬p&q) p: Let O be such that for all r,Or holds if and only if (¬p&q)
¬r . Then O is contranegative. It follows from (¬p&q) (¬p&q) that O(q → p), from
(¬p&q) p that O¬p, and from q > (¬p&q) that ¬O¬q .
Hence, in both cases we have O¬p,O(¬p → ¬q), and ¬O¬q , so that RHS does not
hold.
Part g, from LHS to RHS: Let Op. It follows from this and the substitution-instance
¬p ¬(p ∨ ¬p) of LHS that O(p ∨ ¬p).
Part g, from RHS to LHS: We are going to assume that LHS is violated, and show that
then RHS is also violated. Since LHS is violated, there is some p such that ¬(p∨¬p) > p.
Let O be a predicate such that for all r,Or iff p ¬r . Then O is contranegative. It follows
that O¬p that ¬O(p ∨ ¬p). 
Appendix B
The following is a proof of the result on doubly maximizing preferences referred to in
Section 5.
Definition. Let  be a relation and O a monadic predicate that both take the elements of a
language L as arguments. Then O is a sentence-limited -contranegative predicate if and
only if there is some sentence f ∈L such that for all p ∈L : Op ↔ f ¬p.
Lemma. Let  be a transitive and complete relation over a set L of sentences that has
a finite number of equivalence classes with respect to logical equivalence. Then O is
a non-empty -contranegative predicate on L if and only if it is a sentence-limited -
contranegative predicate on L.
Proof. For the non-trivial direction, let O be -contranegative and non-empty. Since  is
a finite ordering, there is some r such that Or and that ¬Op for all p such that ¬p > ¬r .
We need to show that for all q,Oq iff ¬r ¬q . It follows from the construction of r that if
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¬q > ¬r , then ¬Oq. It follows from Or and the -contranegativity of O that if ¬r ¬q
then Oq. 
Theorem B.1. The following are equivalent conditions on a predicate O :
(1) O is a sentence-limited contranegative predicate with respect to a doubly maximizing
preference relation, and it holds for the sentence limit f that max(f ) is non-maximal.
(2) O satisfies the postulates:
(i) Op & Oq → O(p&q);
(ii) If O(p&q) → Op ∨ Oq;
(iii) If  p → q ,  q → r , Op and Or, then Oq;
(iv) ¬O⊥;
(v) There is some p such that Op.
Proof. From (1) to (2): For (i), let Op and Oq. Then max(f )max(¬p) and max(f )
max(¬q), hence max(f )  max(¬p ∨ ¬q). It follows from min(f )  min(¬p) that
min(f )min(¬p ∨ ¬q). Thus O(p&q).
For (ii), let O(p&q). Then max(f )max(¬p ∨¬q), hence both max(f )max(¬p)
and max(f ) max(¬q). Furthermore, since min(f ) min(¬p ∨ ¬q), either min(f ) 
min(¬p) or min(f )min(¬q). Hence, either Op or Oq.
For (iii), let  p → q ,  q → r , Op and Or. It follows from  ¬q → ¬p that
max(¬p)max(¬q) and from Op that max(f )max(¬p), hence max(f )max(¬q).
Similarly, it follows from  ¬r → ¬q that min(¬r)  min(¬q) and from Or that
min(f )min(¬r), hence min(f )min(¬q). We may conclude that Oq.
For (iv), suppose to the contrary that O⊥, i.e., f ‡ ¬⊥. Then max(f ) is maximal,
contrary to the condition.
For (v), it follows from f ‡ f that O¬f .
From (2) to (1): Let Z = {p | Op}, A = Cn(Z) and B = A\Z. We need the following
two properties of these sets: (A) A is consistent, and (B) B is logically closed.
For (A), suppose to the contrary that A is inconsistent. Then due to compactness there
is a finite and inconsistent subset of Z, but due to (i) and (iv) this is impossible.
For (B), it is sufficient to show (Bα) that if  p → q and p ∈ B , then q ∈ B , and (Bβ)
if p,q ∈ B , then p&q ∈ B .
(Bα): Let p → q and p ∈ B . It follows from p ∈ B ⊆ A, due to (i) and compactness,
that there is some s such that Os and  s → p. Suppose that Oq. Then it follows from (iii)
that Op, contrary to p ∈ B . Hence ¬Oq. It follows that q ∈ B .
(Bβ): Let p,q ∈ B . Clearly p&q ∈ A. Suppose that p&q /∈ B . Then O(p&q), hence
due to (ii) either Op or Oq, contrary to p,q ∈ B .
It follows from (v) that Z = ∅, hence B = A, so that B ⊂ A. Let a = &A and b = &B .
Let B ′ = Cn({b&¬a}). Then A∩ B = A∩ B ′, hence A\B = A\B ′.
Let A be the set of maximal consistent subsets of the language. We are going to con-
struct a preference relation  onA with the strict part > (“better than”) and the symmetric
part ≡ (“equal in value to”). Let A1 = {X ∈ A | A ⊆ X} and A3 = {X ∈ A | B ′ ⊆ X}.
(Note that they have been constructed to be mutually exclusive.) Let A2 =A\(A1 ∪A3).
If A2 is empty, then let f be a sentence such that max(f ) and min(f ) are both in A3. Let
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A1 andA3 be equivalence classes with respect to ≡, and let A1 >A3. If A2 is non-empty,
then let f be such that max(f ) ∈A2 and min(f ) ∈A3. LetA1,A2, andA3 be equivalence
classes with respect to ≡, and let A1 >A2 >A3. Then in both cases:
Op ↔ p ∈ Z
↔ p ∈ A\B
↔ p ∈ A\B ′
↔ p ∈
⋂
A1 and p /∈
⋂
A3
↔ ¬p /∈
⋃
A1 and ¬p ∈
⋃
A3
↔ max(f )max(¬p) and min(f )min(¬p)
↔ f ‡ ¬p. 
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